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Clash of norms 
Judicial leniency on defendant birthdays1 




We document judicial leniency on defendant birthdays across 5 million decisions. French 
sentences are 1% fewer and 3% shorter. U.S. federal sentences are 33% shorter in the day 
component of sentences (the month component remains unaffected). New Orleans sentences 
are 15% shorter overall. No leniency appears on the days before or after a defendant’s birthday. 
Federal judges using deterrence language in opinions, are unaffected, isolating the judicial as 
opposed to defendant channel. The effect is doubled when judge and defendant share the same 





Individuals frequently have to evaluate others’ productions, acts or personhood. In professional 
settings, those evaluations usually have to be done in an impartial way. Professors marking 
exams, loan officers evaluating demands, judges deciding cases are supposed to follow precise 
rules and to only evaluate some defined material. While they are supposed to be independent, 
surrounding norms could affect those evaluations. National or religious holidays, birthday of 
the evaluated person, birth or death of one of the person’s relatives could change the evaluators’ 
judgment. 
In this paper we examine the effect of defendant's birthday on judicial decisions. This event is 
interesting for at least three reasons. First, birthdays are associated with a strong societal norm. 
Indeed, birthdays elicit expectations of favorable treatment for the individual whose birthday it 
is (Greene et al. 1987). For example, patients expect celebration on their birthday (Phillips et 
al. 1973), teachers use birthday parties to integrate refugees (Windzio 2015), and unmet 
expectations on birthdays are associated with suicide (Williams et al. 2011). Second, judicial 
decisions are associated with a very strong professional norm of independence from 
extrajudicial factors. Across different societies, various norms and institutional mechanisms are 
designed to limit the influence of extrajudicial factors: oaths to uphold duty to be impartial, 
                                               
1 Daniel L. Chen, daniel.chen@iast.fr, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, 
University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France. Arnaud Philippe, arnaud.philippe@bristol.ac.uk, University 
of Bristol, Bristol, UK. First draft: June 2017. Current draft: March 2019. Latest version at: 
http://users.nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Clash_of_Norms.pdf. Work on this project was conducted while Chen 
received financial support from the European Research Council (Grant No. 614708), Swiss National Science 
Foundation (Grant Nos. 100018-152678 and 106014-150820), and Agence Nationale de la Recherche. Support 
through ANR Labex is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 2 
disclosure of conflicts of interest, recusal from cases, random assignment to prevent judge 
shopping, ethics committees, appeals, transparency and accountability, tenure, and prohibitions 
on honoraria, political speeches, or campaign donations. These professional norms are 
supposed to mute personal and general societal norms. Third, as judicial decisions dates are 
usually set in advance and follow precise rules (for organizational purposes), birthdays are 
orthogonal to cases characteristics, as the statistical tests confirm. Then, defendant’s birthdays 
present a good setting for measuring if and how professional norms mute social norms. 
Using two different countries, France and the U.S., we show that deciding cases on defendant 
birthdays is likely to be effectively random.  The two countries provide independent evidence 
across a very large sample size of decisions.  Each country offers unique advantages in terms 
of data analysis that taken together portray a compelling picture of judicial leniency on 
defendant birthdays. 
First, we test whether French judges are more lenient on defendant birthdays. The French court 
setting offers administrative data on 4.6 million decisions where proceedings begin with 
opening statements by the judge stating the identity and birthday of the defendant.2  The setting 
is also convenient because there are no sentencing guidelines (only a maximum far above the 
pronounced sentences) and they are usually decided through trial (there is a limited plea 
bargaining mechanism). We estimate that judges are 1% less likely to assign any prison 
sentence to defendants on their birthday if they appear in court.  This effect appears throughout 
the distribution, except at the very top.  Having a decision on one’s birthday reduces the 
sentence by 4 days out of an average total sentence length of 127 days (a 3% shorter sentence). 
The effect seems at least partly driven by the fact that the birthday defendants are convicted of 
a less severe crime, a proxy for partial acquittal or re-qualification in court, effectively 
amounting to a shorter maximum sentence length of 27 days out of 1,283 (a 2% reduction).  
Second, we test whether U.S. judges are also more lenient on defendant birthdays. The federal 
district courts offer controlled conditions on 600,000 decisions in which cases are randomly 
assigned to a single judge.  In addition, sentences of more than a year are eligible for sentencing 
reduction, so we can observe whether judges assign birthday sentences to exceed the one-year 
threshold.  We find that the day component of federal sentences is reduced by 33% (0.13 days 
out of an average 0.36 days) on birthdays except when the month component is 12.   
Third, the characteristics of the samples allow us to dig into the mechanisms. We find that the 
effect of defendant’s birthday is probably intentional rather than due to behavioral biases as it 
is more present when judges have more time to take decisions. We also find that it seems to 
increase with judges’ discretion. Simple case that are routinely decided are less affected than 
more complex cases. 
Lastly, we find that the effect varies with judges’ characteristics and experience. First, in U.S. 
federal district courts, where we observe race, we find significant birthday leniency only if the 
judge and defendant share the same race. Second, using a small sample of 90,000 decisions in 
New Orleans courts, where judges are deemed to be less professional (elected) than the federal 
district court judges (appointed by the U.S. President and confirmed by the Senate), we find 
that the birthday effect can be large, representing up to 15% of the sentence, consistent with 
professionalization reducing some of the societal norm. On the contrary, highly professional 
and independent French appeal court judges are not affected by defendant’s birthday. Third, in 
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U.S. federal district courts, where we observe judicial writing in unrelated cases, we can see 
that economics thinking eliminates the birthday effect, as reflected in their opinions in civil 
cases, which highlights the judicial channel for these effects.  
Altogether, we show that birthday leniency in two different countries is unrelated to the quality 
or merits of the case considered. We exploit high-frequency variation from birthdays, which 
are defendant-specific.  Consequently, the decision-maker has no other reason to be affected by 
the current day. We test whether coordination (a societal signal), like birthdays, can bias high-
stakes decision-making in real-world or field settings such as those involving judges making 
decisions in their primary occupations.  Our analysis also differs from the existing literature on 
coordination in that most of the existing literature does not have random assignment or large 
samples (Greene et al. 1987, Phillips et al. 1973, Windzio 2015, Williams et al. 2011).   
Our setting with life-tenured judges not likely to interact again with the defendant rules out 
many models of social preferences with direct reciprocity motives (Sugden 1984) and 
psychological games involving preferences over the beliefs of recipients (Battigalli et al. 2007). 
For example, the judge is neither expecting a gift from the defendant in return, nor is the 
defendant forming beliefs about the judge to make an action that affects the judge. Societal 
norms to generate benefits for society at large has been linked to indirect reciprocity norms that 
overcome the prisoner’s dilemma and individual-level cost-benefit analysis. Our setting 
involves two very distinct groups, as the probability a judge lives in the same neighborhood as 
the defendant is small. Our finding that judicial in-group favoritism increases with defendant 
birthdays echoes Shayo and Zussman (2011)’s finding that judicial in-group bias increases after 
terrorism.  
Our research also contributes to the sizable psychology literature using vignette studies of small 
samples of judges that suggest unconscious heuristics (e.g., anchoring, status quo bias, 
availability) play a role in decision-making (e.g., Guthrie et al., 2007). In addition, our results 
contribute to the theoretical literature on decision-making, e.g., Bordalo, et al. (2014), which 
models how judges can be biased by legally irrelevant information.3 Our analysis differs from 
the existing literature on extraneous factors in legal outcomes in that our setting offers greater 
control over omitted case characteristics (Danziger et al. 2011; Weinshall-Margel et al., 2011), 
isolates mechanisms via the judicial decision-maker making rather than the lawyers or litigants 
(Eren and Mocan. 2016) or jurors (Anwar et al. 2012; Philippe et al. 2017), and does so with a 
sample size far larger than previous studies of behavioral judging.4 All three features also are 
missing in a study of police stops of drivers (Moore et al. 2016).  
These effects are very significant for the affected defendants, which raises questions about other 
margins of behavioral change not observed by the econometrician and whether professional 
norms are enough to mute social norms. Whether society wants judges to be lenient on 
defendant birthdays is an open question, though gift giving to defendants who share the same 
race is arguably already prohibited. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents the data and setting. Section 3 presents the identification strategy. Section 4 presents 
the results. Section 5 presents mechanisms. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Data and setting 
2.1. France 
We focus on crimes that can be punished by prison sentences of up to ten years.5 This criminal 
category – called “délits” in French – contains the vast majority of what is commonly perceived 
as crimes: theft, violence, drug consumption or drug dealing, and road-related offenses. Our 
time frame from 2002–2014 covers 320,000 and 500,000 convictions per year in the 186 courts 
of first instance (non-appeals).6  
What is called “prison” in the French criminal code is the sum of real prison sentence, prison 
following probation sentence if probation is given, and suspended prison i.e. the maximum 
amount of time a person could spend in prison because of the crime).  Suspended prison is time 
that is added to the next sentence if the same crime is committed within five years.  Maximum 
sentences are generally substantially longer than actual sentences.7 8 Probation sentences will 
be defined by the prison sentence people get in case of violation of their probation9. In this 
paper we will mainly analyze the sum of those sentences.10 These sentences are decided after a 
trial.11  
The correctional courts (for misdemeanor) are composed of three professional judges: one 
“president” that leads the hearing and two assistants.12  Judges have no control over their 
schedule. For each case, when the investigations are finished, the prosecutor in charge of it 
chooses the type of procedure (accelerate/normal) and, based on this, picks the next session of 
the relevant type. The head of the court decides, in the beginning of the year, the number and 
type of audiences per week. 
The original dataset is a compilation of criminal records from the statistics service of the French 
Ministry of Justice (Sous Direction de la Statistique et des Etudes). It contains a detailed 
description of every criminal case judged each year, including the date, place, and procedural 
detail of the trials, the date the defendant is notified of the sentencing decision (frequently 
identical to the trial date if the defendant is present), the date of the crime (if known), and its 
                                               
5  There are two additional categories: minor infractions that cannot be punished by prison (e.g., parking 
infractions) and the most severe crimes (“felonies”) – e.g., murder and rape – that can be punished by up to life 
imprisonment and are judged by specific courts.   
6 Juveniles are judged by specific courts. They are dropped in the analysis. 
7 For example, in 2003, among offenders convicted for a crime that could be punished by up to ten years, 49% 
actually received no prison sentence and 95% of the remainder received a sentence less than or equal to 4 years. 
8 Sentences are supposed to be chosen “according to the circumstances of the crime and the offenders’ personality 
(…) in order to protect society, to punish the offender, to protect victims’ interests and in order to promote 
offender’s rehabilitation and to avoid new crimes” (art. 132-24 of the criminal code, change into art. 130-1). 
9 Probation lengths are not recorded in the database. 
10 They are not unrelated as the sum of the three should not exceed the maximum defined in the penal code. 
However, as mentioned previously, this not a strong limitation in reality. 
11 An exception is for plea-bargaining, which was introduced in France in March 2004. It could only be used for a 
subset of crimes – those with a maximum prison sentence below or equal to five years – and sentences could not 
exceed one year. Plea-bargaining has never exceeded 12.5% of case resolutions in a year since its introduction.  
12 For minor crimes, the French criminal code allows an accelerated procedure that is similar to the normal one 
except that the investigation term is extremely short (less than a week). The prosecutor conducts the investigations 
– and eventually imposes pre-trial detention (another judge controls this decision) – chooses the charges and goes 
for an accelerated procedure if it seems appropriate. 
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exact category based on the criminal code, the sentence decided (e.g., prison, probation, and 
suspended prison), and, finally, sex, nationality and birth date of the defendant.    
We use the years 2002-2014 and our final dataset is composed of 4,608,209 observations.13 The 
descriptive statistics of this data set are presented in the first two columns of table 1. Defendants 
are mainly male (90%), French (81%), and relatively young (33 years old on average). Plea-
bargaining is rare (only 11% of the cases) and defendants are usually present at trial (78% of 
the cases). Road-related infractions are the most frequent crimes (32%) followed by property 
crimes (26%), violence (20%), and drug offenses (9%). Lastly, sentences are short compared 
to those in the United States. It is on average equal to 127.2 days (57.9 prison days, 36.7 
probation days, 32.6 suspended prison days). The first number that is mentioned by the judge 
is the maximum amount of time the defendant could spend incarcerated following the decision, 
i.e., the sum of the prison, probation, and suspended prison sentence.14 72% get sentences that 
could lead to prison. Lastly, people have trials on their birthday 0.27% (1 out of 365) of the 
time, which is what we would expect with an even distribution of trial days across birthdays. 
2.2. USA. 
The United States District Courts (USDC) are the judicial backbone for hearing and sentencing 
federal crimes in the United States. Federal crimes include illegal activity committed on federal 
land, crimes committed by or against federal employees in particular roles, matters involving 
federal government regulations (e.g., illegal immigration, federal tax fraud, counterfeiting), or 
crimes against the U.S. that occur outside of the United States, such as terrorism. Federal crimes 
comprise 8% of the US prison population and constitute the most serious crimes. Among federal 
crimes, the most frequently heard cases involve immigration, drug trafficking, firearms, and 
fraud.   
In almost every case, the defendant enters a plea agreement with the prosecutor, which is then 
approved of, or denied, by the judge. Otherwise, a sentencing trial is held, and the judge 
determines the sentence for the criminal to serve: probation, federal prison, or both. In either 
situation, the judge has final say on the criminal sentence. However, as an agreement is 
frequently settled before the decision, we expect the effect of birthday to be more limited than 
in France where judges have more discretion. 
Judges have some control over their schedule.  They mainly determine the days when they want 
to hear cases or discuss plea agreements. Once the schedule is determined, their courtroom 
deputies fill the calendar with cases.15  Then, if selection based on birthday is, in theory, 
possible, the schedule is strongly constrained – postponing a case means a delay of several 
weeks – and the concrete allocation of the case is not done by the judge himself. This 
organization makes the selection on birthday unlikely. 
                                               
13 1.5 million cases are excluded from the analysis as they could not lead to any prison time (“compositions 
pénales” and “procedures simplifiées”) 
14 For example, “3 years of imprisonment, of which 2 suspended” would mean a sentence equal to one year of 
prison and two years of suspended prison. 
15 According to a judge we talked with: “Most judges will set a bunch of things back to back on a given day – 
guilty plea, sentencing, supervised release or probation violations, etc.  One judge hears criminal matters only 1-
2 days a month.  Others have criminal calendars much more regularly.  The judges set things according to their 
own calendars and then their courtroom deputies notify us of the dates.  (If we have a conflict, we have to file a 
motion to continue.)” 
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Importantly for our study, offenders are eligible to get good time credit if they are sentenced to 
more than a year, i.e., to at least one year and one day. Then, one-year plus one day sentences 
could be considered as less severe than one-year sentences, as the maximum amount of good 
time earned can reduce a one year and one day long sentence by 54 days.    
There are 94 district courts in the United States. At least one district court is located in each 
state or U.S. territory. States that are large or have a large population have sub-state regional 
courts. Cases are randomly assigned to a single judge. The United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC) produces the sentencing guidelines for federal judges to use when they 
make their sentencing decisions. The judges are given a guideline range for the criminal 
sentence that is based upon the severity of the crime and the defendant's criminal history. Due 
to these guidelines, the largest factor determining sentence range is the criminal charges brought 
to the judge by the prosecutor.   
We use the period from October 1991 to September 2003 and our final dataset is composed of 
602,908 observations. Descriptive statistics are presented in the last two columns of table 1. 
Offenders are 35 years old on average and they are mainly male (85%) and US citizens (70%). 
Black and white offenders are equally numerous – around 34% – while Hispanic are slightly 
less numerous (29%). Only 7% of defendants go to trial. Prison sentences are divided into a 
month component, on average equal to 45 months, and a day component, on average equal to 
.36 (6% of cases have sentencing days exceeding 0). 56% of the day components that are not 
equal to zero are equal to one. 80% of those “one-day parts” are associated with 12 months 
sentences leading to one year plus one day sentences, the minimum sentences that make 
offenders eligible to good time credits. Lastly, offenders are sentenced on their birthday 0.28% 
of the time, again roughly 1 in 365.   
We also examine a small sample of 87,319 decisions in New Orleans courts.  New Orleans is 
the largest city and metropolitan area in the state of Louisiana. The Orleans Parish District 
Attorney’s Office and the New Orleans District Attorney (NODA), and their attorneys, are 
responsible for enforcing state criminal laws in New Orleans and surrounding areas. In January 
1988, the Orleans Parish District Attorney established and instituted an office-wide 
computerized system to collect data on every case that was processed through the office. The 
data collection system was designed as an internal office management tool. Our data spans from 
1989 to 1999. The dataset includes detailed information regarding each individual offender and 
the judge that handled his or her case. Once the cases went to the court, they were randomly 
assigned to a court section by the clerk’s office.16 Each section is composed of a single judge.  
3. Identification strategy 
In order to measure the effect of defendants’ birthday we use regressions of the form: 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡%,' = 𝛽* + 𝛽,𝟙./012' + 𝛽3𝟙|5/016'|2, + 𝛽7𝟙|5/016'|23 + 𝛽8𝟙9::;5/01 + 𝑋% + 𝜖%,' 
                                               
16 The Orleans Parish rule was written as follows: “All cases pending in the criminal district court shall be 
allotted equally among Sections A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J of the court. Except on Sundays, legal holidays, 
and legal half-holidays, the allotment of cases shall be made publicly by classes daily at noon by the clerk or a 
deputy clerk selected by him, in the presence of the district attorney. The fact the accused was committed for 
trial at a preliminary examination shall not be grounds for the recusation of the trial judge who held the 
preliminary examination.” 1991 La. R.S. 13:1343. 
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 where: - 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡%,' is the sentence pronounced against i at t. It is measured as the total sentence (in 
days, day winsorized17, or with threshold dummies) in France; the number of months, 
number of days, or departure from guidelines in the U.S. federal district courts; or the 
number of days in New Orleans courts - 𝟙./012' is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken on defendant’s birthday - 𝟙|5/016'|2, and 𝟙|5/016'|23 are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken on one 
(respectively, two) days before or after defendant’s birthday - 𝟙9::;5/01 is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken in the week of defendant’s 
birthday - 𝑋% is a set of control variables (used in the robustness checks): crime category, gender, 
citizenship, plea, recidivist. In the French data and the U.S. federal district data, we can 
add day-of-year fixed effects. In the latter, we can also add education, age, race, judge 
as dummy indicators. 
In this regression, 𝛽, is the parameter of interest. 𝛽3, 𝛽7 and 𝛽8 are expected to be 0. 
This strategy is valid only if birthdays are orthogonal to decisions. We have argued that it is 
most likely true for procedural reasons. Moreover, the proportion of decisions taken on 
defendant’s birthday represents exactly 1/365. In order to further investigate this question, we 
also run balancing checks, i.e., regressions of the form presented in equation 1 with socio-
demographic characteristics or procedural variables as outcomes. Those exercises are presented 
for both France and the U.S. in Table 2. They confirm that birthday is not correlated with 
observable characteristics. Panel A shows that 1 out of 8 tests are significant at the 10% level 
for France and Panel B shows that none of the 7 tests are significant at conventional levels. 
4. Main results 
4.1. France 
Figure 1.a. shows that the average sentence length declines for birthday sentences, but not for 
trial days on days other than the defendant’s birthday. Table 2 presents our baseline 
specification. Column 1 indicates on defendant birthdays, the likelihood of receiving any 
sentence falls by 1%. Column 2 shows that sentences of longer than 6 months are also 1% less 
likely. Column 3 shows that the birthday effect becomes insignificant for sentences longer than 
12 months. This means that sentences are shorter throughout the distribution except at the very 
top, since the average sentence length is 127 days. Column 4 shows that the number of days is 
reduced by roughly 4. Column 5 presents similar estimates where the sentence length is 
winsorized at the 5% level. No significant impact appears for the placebos. The standard errors 
indicate that these coefficients are similarly precisely estimated, but the point estimates are a 
magnitude smaller than the birthday effect. 
 
We then explore the mechanisms. Column 6 of Table 2 shows that defendants are 1% more 
likely to be present or represented by their lawyers on their birthday. If we restrict to the 
defendants who are present or represented (as obliged), the birthday gift increases to 6.4 days 
in Column 7, but there is no gift for defendants who did not answer to the court’s summon in 
                                               
17 We winsorize at the 5% level, meaning we replace the outliers exceeding the top 5% with the 5% threshold 
value. 
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Column 8. The point estimate is in the opposite sign, and the sample size is large. This 
distinction suggests that it is not the scheduler who selects cases more deserving of shorter 
sentences for trial dates coinciding with the defendant’s birthday, because the absent defendants 
do not receive shorter sentences. 
 
Column 9 shows that part of the mechanism appears to be that judges convict defendants of a 
less severe charge, finding them guilty for a crime that has on average 27 day-shorter maximum 
sentence length18, a proxy for partial acquittal or the court requalifying the defendant’s crime. 
The average maximum sentence length is 1,283 days. In the appendix, we show that the results 
are robust to perturbations of the main specification - removing controls, adding controls for 
case and defendant characteristics, dropping crimes conducted on defendant birthdays, or 
adding day fixed effects in Table A1. In Table A2, we show that drug offenses—but not violent 
offenses—benefit from the judicial leniency. In Table A3, we report larger effects for male 




Figure 1.b. shows that the number of days in a federal sentence declines on the defendants’ 
birthday, but not the days before or after the birthday. In Table 3, Column 3, we present results 
for the baseline specification and find that judges are assigning 0.13 fewer days if the decision 
occurs on the defendant’s birthday, all else equal. The effect of 0.13 is about one-third the 
average number of days (0.36). Columns 1 and 2 show that there is no impact on downward 
departures from the guideline nor on the month component of the sentence. We also see no 
impact on the days before or after the birthday. In the appendix, we show the results are robust 
perturbations of the main specification, removing controls or adding controls for case and 
defendant characteristics, judge fixed effects, or day fixed effects in Table B1.  
However, as we previously mentioned, the meaning of the days component of the sentence 
differs depending on the month component it is associated with. While having some days in 
addition to the months is usually harsher, it is not the case if the month part is equal to one year, 
when having one day instead of zero make offenders eligible to get good time credit. In order 
to further investigate the effect of birthday on the day component of the sentences we split our 
sample into offenders sentenced to 12 months and other offenders. The probabilities to get at 
least one day around birthday for those two subsamples are presented in Columns 5 and 6. A 
clearer pattern emerges. While the probability to get any days is smaller (by 33% of the average 
likelihood to receive any amount of days) when the month component is not equal to 12, it is 
higher when the month part is equal to twelve. Then, in both cases, sentences seem more lenient 
on birthday. Column 7 shows an insignificant decrease in the day component of sentence 
lengths when the month component is equal to 12.19 The placebo coefficients are again far 
smaller and also insignificant. In Table B2, we show that property offenses—but not drug 
offenses—benefit from the judicial leniency. We also report larger effects for those who do the 
                                               
18 As mentioned in the introduction, this maximum is defined, for each crime, in the criminal code.  
19 We check if this is due to judges shifting sentences in the region between 10 months and 8 days (sentences 
equal to 12 months plus one day are eligible to 54 days reductions i.e. could be equal to 10 months plus 8 days) 
to 12 months to the region above 12 months. We find that 0.22% of sentences have a birthday in the region, 
while 0.31% of sentences in the region above 12 and 13 months have a birthday. 
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normal procedure and plea guilty and for those who are male (Table B3). 
 
5. Mechanisms 
5.1. Thinking fast or thinking slow 
We first want to understand if the effect of the norm is a behavioral bias – close to what could 
be observed with events affecting a judge’s mood – that could be eliminated with nudges or 
longer deliberation, or if it could be intentionally taken into account. In order to discriminate 
between those two hypotheses, we measure the effect of birthday depending on the time taken 
by the court to decide the case. If birthdays affect decisions taken in a very short time it will 
support the idea of a behavioral bias. On the contrary, if birthdays mainly affect decisions taken 
when judges have time to decide, it will be in line with a more intentional mechanism.  
We use two instruments to measure the time judges take to decide the case. First, we use the 
caseload at the individual level (USDC) or at the court level (France). Second, in France, we 
compare decisions taken under an accelerated procedure or under a normal procedure. 
Accelerated procedure is a legal mechanism to ensure only a short delay between the crime and 
trial and is used for reasonably simple cases. This procedure is well known for inducing 
overcrowded sessions and very short hearing of the cases (Christin 2008). 
The results are presented in Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 present the effect of birthdays when 
caseloads are above or below the median (respectively). In both France (Panel A) and the USDC 
(Panel B) the effect is only significant when the caseload is smaller than the median. Columns 
3 and 4 present the results for accelerated and normal procedure (respectively) in France. The 
effect of birthdays in accelerated procedure is not significant even if the coefficient is in 
negative and sizable.20 Taken together those results support the idea of an intentional effect. 
 
5.2. Judicial discretion 
The second exercise we run aims at identifying the types of cases that are affected by birthday 
norms. Different hypotheses could be made here. First, it is possible that all types of case benefit 
from the birthday effect. Second, the effect could be restricted to common cases that are quite 
simple to determine – and for which judges simply cut part of the sentence – while for more 
complex cases the birthday effect is swamped by other considerations. Lastly, the effect could 
be restricted to complex cases for which the discretion of the judge is higher, while simple cases 
are strongly restricted by courts’ regular practices. 
In order to address this question, we regress sentences on the observables (socio-demographic 
characteristics and types of crime), extract the coefficients and create a predicted value of the 
sentence. We then measure the absolute value of the distance between a decision and the 
predicted decision for the same case. Finally, we measure the effect of birthday on decisions 
above or below the median in term of distance to the predicted sentence. Our hypothesis is that 
                                               
20 If we use a dummy equal to one if the defendant gets at least one day (instead of the number of days) the 
coefficient of birthday under accelerated procedure is positive and not significant. The coefficient for normal 
procedure remains negative and significant (result not shown). 
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cases that are further to the predicted sentence are more complex, ambiguous cases that could 
not be simply understood with the observable variables. 
The effect of birthday on those two types of case is presented in Table 5, Columns 5 and 6. In 
France (Panel A), the effect of birthday is twice as large for cases that are further from the 
predictions. In The US, the effect of birthday is only significant for cases further from the 
prediction. Taken together, those results are consistent with the idea that birthday have more 
effect when judges’ discretion is higher. 
 
5.3. In-group bias 
In the US district court data, we have the judicial identity, which allows further exploration of 
the effect depending on judges’ and defendants’ characteristics. Table 6 Columns 1 and 2 
examine the role of in-group bias.   Column 1 shows that individuals who share the same race 
as the judge receive fewer sentencing days.  However, the effect is multiplied by 4 when it is 
the defendant’s birthday.  The level term of the birthday effect indicates that it is largely driven 
by same-race gift-giving.21  Column 2 finds no in-group effects when it comes to gender with 
or without the birthday sentences.  
  
5.4. Judges’ experience and deterrence thinking 
Lastly, we measure how experience and training affect how birthday is taken into account. We 
first measure the effect in two types of court composed of either extremely selected judges or 
less professional ones. In Table 6, column 3, we measure the effect of birthday in French appeal 
courts. Judges sitting in those courts are strongly selected and their promotion should be 
validated by a national independent commission (the “Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature”). 
We do not observe any birthday effect in those courts. This null result could be explained by 
several mechanisms – especially the fact that an anchor has been settled at the first trial – but it 
is consistent with the idea that more professional judges are not affected by birthday. However, 
we suspect anchoring is less likely the explanation since U.S. district judges have sentencing 
guidelines as anchor their decisions, yet are still affected by defendant birthdays. 
For contrast, in Column 4, we use data from criminal courts in New Orleans Parish. Those 
courts are characterized by less professional judges who run for election in comparison to U.S. 
federal district court judges, who are appointed with life tenure by the U.S. President and 
confirmed by the Senate. The effect of birthday appears to be very large, decreasing the 
sentences by 86 days (-14.6%). No significant impact appears for the placebos.22   
Lastly, in Column 5, we measure how judicial thinking changes the effect of birthday. We 
investigate this question by using the presence of deterrence language in civil cases, a proxy for 
economic thinking. Judges below-median in economics thinking are affected by birthdays, 
decreasing the days component by 0.17, while those above-median in economics thinking are 
                                               
21 The sample size is reduced in this Table because we do not have the judge identity in every case. 
22 Robustness checks of this result are presented in Appendix D table D2, where we perturb the specification.  
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essentially unaffected by birthdays. 23   This result highlights the judicial channel as any 
behavioral change by the litigant would be present in both sets of judges. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We document strong birthday effects on decision-makers, unrelated to the quality of cases in 
French and U.S. courts. We find consistent evidence with many common links across the two 
countries. The judges find ways to be more lenient on defendant birthdays. We show that the 
birthday effect is more consistent with gift giving. We can rule out general mood effects and 
reciprocity concerns that motivate typical models of gift giving. Beyond the three court settings 
we study, our findings could have broader implications. Almost all individuals make decisions 
embedded in everyday life. Our results suggest that social norms transmitted through rituals 
can perversely lead to unfair or incorrect decisions in important situations even when 
professional norms have been designed to mute them. 
 
 
   
                                               
23 Data on deterrence language comes from Ash et al. (2017), which documents the spread of the concept of 
deterrence in the federal judiciary. A description of how the measure is constructed is in the appendix. 
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(a : France) 
 
     (b : USA) 
Figure 1: Main Results, Visual.  
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 France USA 
  Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Male .9 .29 .85 .36 
Age 33.0 12.0 35.2 11.6 
Citizen .83 .37 .70 .46 
White   .35 .48 
Hispanic   .27 .44 
Black   .35 .48 
Plea bargaining .11 .31 .93 .26 
Present at trial .78 .41   
Investigation length 353.3 519.43   
Time pre trial detention 7.49 52.8     
Crime     
Property .26 .44 .29 .45 
Road .32 .47   
Violence .2 .4 .1 .30 
Drug .09 .28 .41 .49 
Max. possible sentence 1283.3 883.49     
Sentence     
Sentence (dummy) .72 .45   
Sentence (day) 127.21 222.4   
Prison (USA month 
part)   45.9 64.4 
Prison (USA day part)     .36 2.4 
Bday .0027 .0517 .0028 .0528 
N 4,608,209   602,908   
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
Columns 1 and 2 present the statistics for French criminal courts while columns 3 and 4 present 
statistics for US District courts.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Male Citizen Age Black Property Road Violence Drug Invest.  
          crimes crimes   crimes Length  
Panel A: France 
Bday 0.0034 0.0024 0.22*  -0.00045 -0.0015 -0.0010 0.00079 4.65 
 (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.13)  (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0044) (0.0031) (5.76) 
1 day -0.00023 0.0075** 0.16  -0.0010 0.00086 0.0028 0.0015 5.08 
before/after (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.11)  (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0025) (4.66) 
2 days -0.00018 0.0030 0.18*  0.0014 0.0023 0.00038 -0.0034 -0.72 
before/after (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.10)  (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0025) (4.64) 
Bday's week -0.00074 -0.0016 -0.16**  -0.0035 0.0018 0.0027 -0.000043 -0.83 
 (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.074)  (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0018) (3.27) 
          
Observations 4,608,209 4,608,209 4,608,209  4,608,209 4,608,209 4,608,209 4,608,209 4,608,209 
Panel B: USDC 
Bday -0.0098 0.0082 0.30 -0.0068 -0.0042  0.0038 0.00077  
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.33) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.0090) (0.015)  
1 day -0.0076 -0.00037 0.45* -0.014 0.012  -0.0029 -0.013  
before/after (0.0087) (0.011) (0.27) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.0073) (0.012)  
2 days -0.024*** 0.0095 0.28 -0.022* 0.0072  0.0012 -0.0038  
before/after (0.0088) (0.011) (0.27) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.0073) (0.012)  
Bday's week 0.0077 -0.0032 -0.52*** 0.010 -0.0025  -0.0019 0.0013  
 (0.0061) (0.0081) (0.19) (0.0084) (0.0079)  (0.0052) (0.0086)  
          
Observations 602,113 585,199 602,790 593,238 602,804   602,804 602,804   
 
Table 2: Balancing checks. 
All columns present the effect on the variable mentioned in the header. Birthday is a dummy 
equal to one if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. The second and third 
explanatory variables are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken one day (respectively, 
two days) before or after the defendant's birthday. The fourth dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one if the decision is taken between three days before and three days after the 
defendant's birthday.   
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 






 All   Present Absent  
  non 0 >6 months >12 months Quantum 
Quantum 
winsorize   Quantum Quantum   
             
Birthday -0.011** -0.0087** -0.0028 -4.13* -4.18*** 0.013*** -6.39** 1.85 -26.8*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0038) (0.0026) (2.48) (1.51) (0.0045) (2.97) (3.75) (9.62) 
1 day -0.0025 0.00078 -0.0013 0.78 -0.45 0.0023 0.32 2.03 2.84 
before/after (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0021) (2.06) (1.24) (0.0037) (2.48) (3.01) (7.96) 
2 days 0.0013 0.0014 -0.000049 -2.32 -0.39 0.00020 -2.00 -3.54 -8.24 
before/after (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0021) (1.98) (1.24) (0.0037) (2.41) (2.68) (7.91) 
Birthday 0.0022 0.0038* 0.0013 2.60* 1.67* 0.0042 2.82 1.00 1.66 
week (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0015) (1.43) (0.88) (0.0026) (1.74) (1.96) (5.61) 
             
Constant 0.72*** 0.14*** 0.058*** 127*** 109*** 0.78*** 136*** 94.2*** 1,283*** 
Observations 4,608,209 3,597,969 1,010,240 4,608,209 
 
Table 3: Main results, France. 
The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is a dummy equal to one if sentences - i.e., the sum 
of prison quantum, probation quantum and suspended prison quantum - is greater than 0 
(respectively, 6 months, 1 year). Column 4 presents the effect on the overall quantum while 
column 5 presents the same result when quantum is winsorized at the 5% level. Column 6 
presents the effect on a dummy equal to one if the defendant appears for arraignment. Columns 
7 and 8 present the effect on quantum for defendant who appear/do not appear for arraignment 
respectively. Lastly, the dependent variable in column 7 is the maximum possible sentence (in 
days) of the main charge convicted. Birthday is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken 
on the defendant's birthday. The second and third explanatory variables are dummies equal to 
one if the decision is taken one day (respectively, two days) before or after the defendant's 
birthday. The fourth dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








component Day >0 
Day 
component Day >0 
Day 
component Day >0 
 All Without 12m sentences 12m sentences only 
                  
Birthday -0.00096 -0.66 -0.13** -0.0049 -0.13** -0.0093* -0.12 0.030 
 (0.015) (1.86) (0.053) (0.0066) (0.055) (0.0048) (0.12) (0.070) 
1 day 0.0073 -0.81 0.020 0.0033 0.023 0.00075 -0.12 -0.059 
before/after (0.013) (1.58) (0.056) (0.0057) (0.058) (0.0044) (0.15) (0.058) 
2 days -0.0033 -0.19 0.037 0.0039 0.041 0.0053 -0.097 -0.077 
before/after (0.012) (1.62) (0.056) (0.0057) (0.058) (0.0045) (0.18) (0.059) 
Birthday 0.0049 0.043 -0.036 -0.0032 -0.041 -0.0020 0.12 0.047 
week (0.0089) (1.10) (0.039) (0.0040) (0.041) (0.0031) (0.10) (0.043) 
 
          
Constant 0.39*** 45.9*** 0.37*** 0.058*** 0.35*** 0.033*** 0.65*** 0.57*** 
Observations 558,261 592,844 592,844 592,844 565,573 565,573 27,271 27,271 
 
Table 4: Main results, U.S. District Courts 
In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the judge decides for a 
downward departure from sentencing guideline. In column 2, the outcome variable is the month 
part of the sentences. In column 3, 5 and 7, the outcome variable is the day part of the sentences. 
In column 4, 6 and 8, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the day part of the 
sentence is greater than zero. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to defendants who get 
a sentence with a month part different from 12. In columns 7 and 8, the sample is restricted to 
defendants who get a sentence with a month part equal to 12. Birthday is a dummy equal to one 
if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. The second and third explanatory variables 
are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken one day (respectively, two days) before or 
after the defendant's birthday. The fourth dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the 
decision is taken between three days before and three days after the defendant's birthday.   
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Case load Accelerated procedure |residual| 
  Above Below Yes No <median >median 
Panel A: France 
Bday -2.94 -5.21** -8.75 -3.78** -2.46** -5.39** 
 (2.07) (2.17) (5.63) (1.53) (1.14) (2.66) 
1 day -1.48 0.58 1.55 -0.47 1.08 -1.30 
before/after (1.69) (1.80) (4.63) (1.26) (0.95) (2.19) 
2 days -0.23 -0.35 3.47 -1.76 -0.86 0.13 
before/after (1.69) (1.80) (4.57) (1.26) (0.95) (2.18) 
Bday's week 1.57 1.57 2.05 1.61* 0.34 2.61* 
 (1.21) (1.27) (3.32) (0.89) (0.67) (1.55) 
         
Constant 101*** 116*** 192*** 101*** 71.6*** 146*** 
Observations 2,251,051 2,357,158 397,988 4,210,221 2,304,332 2,303,877 
Panel B: USDC 
Bday -0.017 -0.12*     0.0011 -0.24** 
 (0.13) (0.064)     (0.0037) (0.099) 
1 day 0.021 0.11     0.00099 0.018 
before/after (0.12) (0.093)     (0.0030) (0.10) 
2 days 0.099 0.081     0.000021 0.063 
before/after (0.12) (0.088)     (0.0029) (0.10) 
Bday's week -0.095 -0.074     -0.00097 -0.068 
 (0.078) (0.056)     (0.0021) (0.073) 
         
Constant 0.40*** 0.26***     0.0075*** 0.68*** 
Observations 119,230 154,600     279,114 316,969 
 
Table 5: Mechanisms – cases’ characteristics 
Panel A presents the results for France. In column 1-4, the outcome variable is the total prison 
sentence length (days) winsorized at the 5% level. Panel B presents the results for U.S. federal 
district courts. In column 1-4, the outcome variable is the day part of the sentences. In column 
1 and 2, caseloads are defined as the number of decisions taken in a court in a day (France) or 
by a judge in a day (USDC). In column 1 (resp. 2), samples are restricted to caseloads below 
(resp. above) the median. In column 3 and 4, “accelerated procedure” is a specific procedure 
defined in the French criminal code. In column 5 and 6, the outcome variable is the absolute 
value of the residual from a regression of sentences (total prison sentence length in France, day 
part of the sentences in USDC) on socio-demographic variables, crime types and time fixed 
effects.  Birthday is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. 
The second and third explanatory variables are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken 
one day (respectively, two days) before or after the defendant's birthday. The fourth dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken between three days before and three 
days after the defendant's birthday.   
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 USA France, appeal courts New Orleans USDC 
 Day component Prison (day) Prison (day) Day component 
          
Bday -0.018 -0.12** 8.05 -86.1* -0.17*** 
 (0.057) (0.052) (7.98) (50.8) (0.053) 
Bday*Same race -0.061     
 (0.038)     
Same race -0.017     
 (0.011)     
Black defendant -0.050***     
 (0.011)     
Black Judge 0.021*     
 (0.011)     
Bday*Same sex  0.047    
  (0.046)    
Same sex  0.0010    
  (0.015)    
Female judge  -0.0085    
  (0.015)    
Female defendant  0.024    
  (0.015)    
Bday*econ training     0.15** 
     (0.065) 
Econ training     -0.061*** 
     (0.0082) 
1 day 0.014 0.049 6.36 -17.0 0.038 
before/after (0.063) (0.074) (6.68) (44.1) (0.075) 
2 days 0.021 0.12 -3.32 41.3 0.11 
before/after (0.069) (0.083) (6.61) (44.8) (0.084) 
Bday's week 0.0011 -0.032 -0.84 -15.8 -0.022 
 (0.044) (0.051) (4.71) (31.5) (0.052) 
      
Constant 0.11*** 0.17*** 206*** 591*** 0.20*** 
Observations 103,177 172,789 306,322 87,319 167,404 
 Table 6: Mechanisms – judges’ characteristics 
The first four columns present results for U.S. federal district courts. The outcome variable is 
the day part of the sentences. In column 1, the sample is restricted to black and white defendants. 
In columns 2 to 4, the sample is restricted to decisions for which, respectively, the gender, the 
tenure or the use of deterrence in civil cases is known. Column 5 presents results for decisions 
taken in the New Orleans Parish (Louisiana). The outcome is the total prison sentence length 
(days) winsorized at the 5% level.  Birthday is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken on 
the defendant's birthday. The second and third explanatory variables are dummies equal to one 
if the decision is taken one day (respectively, two days) before or after the defendant's birthday. 
The fourth dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken between three 
days before and three days after the defendant's birthday.   
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Appendix A: France 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sentences (prison+probation+suspended prison)  
  non 0 >6 months Quantum Q winsorize 
Panel A: Control for case and defendant characteristics 
(N=4,608,011) 
Bday -0.0063 -0.0044 -0.68 -2.04* 
  (0.0046) (0.0033) (1.80) (1.16) 
Panel B: Dropping crimes committed on Birthday (N=4,580,710) 
Bday -0.0093* -0.0064* -2.83 -3.13** 
  (0.0050) (0.0038) (2.49) (1.51) 
Panel C: Control for placebo only (N=4,608,209) 
Bday -0.0087** -0.0049 -1.55 -2.21** 
  (0.0041) (0.0031) (2.03) (0.98) 
Panel D: Control for birthday week only (N=4,608,209) 
Bday -0.010** -0.0095*** -3.62* -3.42*** 
  (0.0044) (0.0034) (2.19) (1.06) 
Panel E: No control (N=4,608,209) 
Bday -0.010** -0.0095*** -3.62* -3.42*** 
  (0.0044) (0.0034) (2.19) (1.06) 
Panel F: Including day fixed effects (N=4,608,209) 
Bday -0.011** -0.0087** -4.14* -4.19*** 
  (0.0049) (0.0038) (2.48) (1.50) 
Table A1: Robustness Checks 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is a dummy equal to one if sentences - i.e., the sum 
of prison quantum, probation quantum and suspended prison quantum - is greater than 0 
(respectively 6 months). Column 3 presents the effect on the overall quantum while column 4 
presents the same result when quantum is winsorized at the 5% level. Birthday is a dummy 
equal to one if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. Results presented in the 
different panels are for separate regressions. Regressions in panel A include controls for case 
(crime type, plea bargaining, time between crime and trial, and criminal career) and defendant 
characteristics (age, sex, and French citizenship). Regressions in panel B exclude crimes 
committed on the defendant’s birthday. Regressions in panel C include dummies equal to one 
if the decision is taken one day (respectively, two days) before or after the defendant's birthday 
but no dummy for decisions taken in the week of the defendant’s birthday. Regressions in panel 
D include the week dummy but not the dummies for the days one or two days before or after 
the defendant’s birthday. Regressions in panel E do not include any control variables. 
Regressions in panel F include day fixed effects (4,294 dummies). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Property Road related Violence Drug Immigration Verbal assault 
  crime    of a policeman 
              
Birthday -5.203 -0.464 -4.976 -17.92** -18.31 -5.779 
 (3.610) (1.509) (4.541) (7.191) (14.68) (4.142) 
1 day -1.419 0.125 1.768 -2.063 -7.440 -4.085 
before/after (2.957) (1.216) (3.725) (5.910) (12.14) (3.581) 
2 days -1.512 2.085* -0.788 4.828 -31.50*** -3.615 
before/after (2.968) (1.228) (3.756) (6.116) (10.68) (3.478) 
Birthday 4.050* -0.248 1.610 4.389 20.34** 5.271** 
week (2.095) (0.861) (2.650) (4.249) (8.621) (2.546) 
       
Constant 130.8*** 60.08*** 146.1*** 183.5*** 105.0*** 67.52*** 
Observations 925,573 1,451,745 543,508 388,751 55,487 262,002 
Table A2: Heterogeneity, crime types. 
All columns present the effect on the overall quantum winsorized at the 5% level. Birthday is a 
dummy equal to one if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. The second and third 
explanatory variables are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken one day (respectively, 
two days) before or after the defendant's birthday. The fourth dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one if the decision is taken between three days before and three days after the 
defendant's birthday. Samples are restricted to the categories mentioned in the header. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Men Women French Non citizen Plea Trial 
         
              
Birthday -4.646*** -0.665 -3.318** -8.297** -0.535 -4.641*** 
 (1.600) (4.242) (1.624) (3.944) (1.850) (1.657) 
1 day -1.252 7.132** -0.204 -0.907 1.479 -0.736 
before/after (1.319) (3.524) (1.332) (3.314) (1.520) (1.364) 
2 days -0.313 -1.092 0.741 -5.844* -0.549 -0.502 
before/after (1.321) (3.458) (1.339) (3.255) (1.507) (1.364) 
Birthday 1.974** -0.934 0.856 5.630** -0.313 2.076** 
week (0.937) (2.445) (0.945) (2.356) (1.079) (0.968) 
         
Constant 111.2*** 86.18*** 106.7*** 119.3*** 47.03*** 116.3*** 
Observations 4,166,724 441,485 3,845,409 762,800 503,327 4,104,882 
Table A3: Heterogeneity, socio-demographic characteristics and procedure. 
All columns present the effect on the overall quantum winsorized at the 5% level. Birthday is a 
dummy equal to one if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. The second and third 
explanatory variables are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken one day (respectively, 
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two days) before or after the defendant's birthday. The fourth dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one if the decision is taken between three days before and three days after the 




Appendix B: USA 








component Day >0 Day >0 Day >0 
  All Wo 12 m 12m only All Wo 12 m 12m only 
Panel A: Control for case and defendant caracteristics 
Bday -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.018 -0.00537 -0.0080** 0.050 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.056) (0.00540) (0.0037) (0.054) 
Obs 558,228 532,158 26,069 558,228 532,158 26,069 
Panel B: Control for judge fixed effects 
Bday -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.041 -0.0055 -0.0038 0.048 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.10) (0.0086) (0.0052) (0.10) 
Obs 178,830 170,772 8,058 178,830 170,772 8,058 
Panel C: Control for placebos only 
Bday -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.0053 -0.0081 -0.011*** 0.077 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.056) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.056) 
Obs 592,844 565,573 27,271 592,844 565,573 27,271 
Panel D: Control for birthday week only 
Bday -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.046 -0.0073 -0.011*** 0.078 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.088) (0.0058) (0.0041) (0.060) 
Obs 592,844 565,573 27,271 592,844 565,573 27,271 
Panel E: No control 
Bday -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.0054 -0.0081 -0.011*** 0.078 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.056) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.056) 
Obs 592,844 565,573 27,271 592,844 565,573 27,271 
Panel F: Including day fixed effects 
Bday -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14 -0.00515 -0.010** 0.060 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.14) (0.00660) (0.0048) (0.072) 
Obs 595,660 568,393 27,154 595,660 568,393 27,154 
 Table B1: Robustness Checks 
In column 1, 2 and 3, the outcome variable is the day part of the sentences. In column 2, 3 and 
4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the day part of the sentence is greater than 
zero. In columns 2 and 5, the sample is restricted to defendants who get a sentence with a month 
part different from 12. In columns 3 and 6, the sample is restricted to defendants who get a 
sentence with a month part equal to 12. Birthday is a dummy equal to one if the decision is 
taken on the defendant's birthday. Results presented in the different panels are for separate 
regressions. Regressions in panel A include controls for case (crime type and year and month 
of the decision) and defendant characteristics (age, sex, race, and education). Regressions in 
panel B include judge fixed effects (972 fixed effects). Regressions in panel C include dummies 
equal to one if the decision is taken one day (respectively, two days) before or after the 
defendant's birthday but not dummy for decision taken in the week of defendant’s birthday. 
Regressions in panel D include the week dummy but not the dummies for the days one or two 
days before or after the defendant’s birthday. Regressions in panel E do not include any control 
variables. Regressions in panel F include day fixed effects (3,875 dummies).  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Day component without 12-month sentences 
 Property Violence Drug 
 Plea 
bargaining  Trial 
            
Birthday -0.18 -0.17 -0.042 -0.14* -0.0098 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.090) (0.080) (0.16) 
1 day -0.012 0.11 0.017 0.026 0.0099 
before/after (0.096) (0.12) (0.074) (0.066) (0.13) 
2 days 0.040 -0.11 0.026 0.045 0.025 
before/after (0.096) (0.12) (0.074) (0.066) (0.13) 
Birthday 0.0071 0.094 -0.052 -0.040 -0.095 
week (0.069) (0.086) (0.052) (0.046) (0.094) 
       
Constant 0.26*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.37*** 0.10*** 
Observations 162,523 57,717 235,755 527,340 41,472 
Table B2: Heterogeneity, crime types and procedure. 
All columns present the effect on the day part of the sentences. 12 months sentences are 
excluded. Birthday is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. 
The second and third explanatory variables are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken 
one day (respectively, two days) before or after the defendant's birthday. The fourth dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken between three days before and three 
days after the defendant's birthday. Samples are restricted to the categories mentioned in the 
header. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Day component without 12-month sentences 
 Men Women  US citizen  Non citizen  No education 
 Some 
education 
              
Birthday -0.16* 0.019 -0.067 -0.25 -0.097 -0.12 
 (0.081) (0.20) (0.060) (0.21) (0.13) (0.081) 
1 day 0.028 0.010 0.00085 0.046 -0.0025 0.037 
before/after (0.067) (0.16) (0.049) (0.17) (0.11) (0.067) 
2 days -0.0045 0.29* 0.015 0.15 0.15 -0.011 
before/after (0.067) (0.16) (0.049) (0.17) (0.11) (0.066) 
Birthday -0.020 -0.16 0.00026 -0.13 -0.075 0.0065 
week (0.047) (0.12) (0.035) (0.12) (0.076) (0.047) 
         
Constant 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.16*** 0.78*** 0.42*** 0.22*** 
Observations 483,807 84,180 390,318 162,001 230,243 303,710 
Table B3: Heterogeneity: socio-demographic characteristics. 
All columns present the effect on the day part of the sentences. 12 months sentences are 
excluded. Birthday is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken on defendant's birthday. 
The second and third explanatory variables are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken 
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one day (respectively, two days) before or after the defendant's birthday. The fourth 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the decision is taken between three days before 
and three days after the defendant's birthday. Samples are restricted to the categories 
mentioned in the header.  
 27 
Appendix C: Economics language in judicial opinions 
To score judges, Ash et al. (2017) calculate the relative frequency of deterrence in each 
opinion of a judge. As normalization steps, they remove punctuation, capitalization, 
functional stopwords, numbers, and word endings. Then, for each opinion i, they have a 
frequency Fi. One potential concern is that the measure may simply pick up public discourse 
within year, so they normalize this by the relative word frequency of deterrence in Google 
Books. Then, they take the average deterrence score for judges in a year to get a deterrence 
style, which is then demeaned by the district-year average of that year to calculate the relative 
intensity of deterrence language relative to other judges. Finally, they take the average score 




Appendix D: New Orleans 
 
 
  New Orleans parish 
  mean sd 
Male .85 .36 
Age 26.73 10.39 
Black .34 .47 
Crime   
Property .52 .5 
Drug .24 .43 
Sentence   
Prison (day) 590.89 693.61 
Bday .0029 .054 
N 87,319   
 







  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Male Black Juvenile Age Drug Property Sexual  
          crimes crimes assault  
        
Bday 0.0090 0.031 0.016 0.46 -0.017 -0.023 0.0034 
 (0.028) (0.037) (0.030) (0.83) (0.039) (0.033) (0.017) 
1 day -0.0066 0.023 0.0022 0.56 -0.016 -0.013 0.015 
before/after (0.024) (0.031) (0.024) (0.67) (0.033) (0.028) (0.015) 
2 days 0.00090 0.051 0.0011 -0.059 -0.014 0.017 -0.016 
before/after (0.024) (0.031) (0.024) (0.66) (0.033) (0.028) (0.013) 
Bday's week -0.0036 -0.0063 -0.016 -0.10 0.011 0.0043 -0.0071 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.48) (0.023) (0.020) (0.0099) 
        
Constant 0.85*** 0.34*** 0.18*** 26.7*** 0.52*** 0.24*** 0.055*** 
Observations 87,319 87,319 87,319 87,319 87,319 87,319 87,319 
 
Table D2: Balancing Checks 
All columns present the effect on the variable mentioned in the header. Birthday is a dummy 
equal to one if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. The second and third 
explanatory variables are dummies equal to one if the decision is taken one day (respectively, 
two days) before or after the defendant's birthday. The fourth dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one if the decision is taken between three days before and three days after the 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Prison time (days) 
  Quantum winsorize Quantum 
      
Bday -98.9** -102** -94.1** -102** -575** 
 (40.0) (40.0) (43.8) (40.0) (282) 
1 day -3.01 -32.7   41.5 
before/after (33.8) (31.0)   (387) 
2 days 15.8 25.6   177 
before/after (33.6) (32.1)   (409) 
Bday's week -7.34  -7.81  35.4 
 (23.2)  (18.3)  (274) 
      
Control Yes No No No No 
      
Constant 628*** 591*** 591*** 591*** 1,144*** 
Observations 87,319 87,319 87,319 87,319 87,319 
 
Table D3: Robustness checks 
In columns 1 through 4, the outcome variable is total sentence length winsorized at the 5% 
level. In column 5, the dependent variable is total sentence length. We usually winsorize this 
variable as it goes up to 321,120 days while the 95 percentile is only 2,700 days.  In columns 1 
controls for crime categories and socio-demographic characteristics are included. Birthday is a 
dummy equal to one if the decision is taken on the defendant's birthday. Regressions in columns 
1, 2, and 5 include dummies equal to one if the decision is taken one day (respectively, two 
days) before or after the defendant's birthday. Regressions in columns 1, 3, and 5 include a 
dummy for the decision taken in the week of defendant’s birthday. 
  
 
